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Article
Reproductive Surrogacy at the Millennium: Proposed
Model Legislation Regulating "Non-Traditional"

Gestational Surrogacy Contracts
Weldon E. Havins* and James J. Dalessio**

In the creative process there is the father,an author of the play;

the mother,an actorpregnantwith the part; and the child, the role
to be born.'

I. INTRODUCTION

The advancement of the science of artificial reproductive technology (ART) has

created ever-increasing options to the person or couple who wishes to beget a
.genetically related child. Single, infertile, or childless men who, just a few years

ago, never would have imagined the possibility of fatherhood can now opt for
parenthood.3 Today, couples with functioning gonads who nevertheless are
incapable of bearing children can elect to beget their own genetic children through

the modem technique of gestational surrogacy. Women with non-functioning
ovaries or women who have undergone a hysterectomy, through the science of

ART, can have their own genetic children. Women wishing to delay having children
but anxious about losing their opportunity to reproduce, can have their eggs
harvested and frozen for their or another's future use.4

*
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KONSTANTIN SERGEEVICH ALEKsEEV STANISLAVsKI, AN ACrOR PREPARES 312 (Elizabeth Reynolds
1.
Hapgood trans., 1988) (1936).
See generally Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438,453-55 (1972) (finding a constitutional, fundamental
2.
right to "beget" a child).
This can be accomplished either by using donated sperm and a traditional surrogacy arrangement, or
3.
by using donated sperm and ovum fertilized in vitro and implanted in a gestational surrogate.
4. See Laura Bonetta, Postponing PregnancyBy Freezing Oocytes, 4 NAT. MED. 138, 138 (1998); see
also Edgardo Young et al., Triplet PregnancyAfter IntracytoplasmicSperm Injection of CryopreservedOoctyes:
Case Report, 70 FERTILITY & STERILITY 360, 360 (1998); Kutluk Oktay et al., Cryopreservationof Immature
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However, the miracle of ART-perhaps as significant a milestone in the
development of modem science as mankind walking on the moon-faces its
greatest challenge at the regulatory level. One prime example of this challenge
arises in contractual surrogacy arrangements. Surrogacy contracts come in two
forms: traditional surrogacy, wherein a man's, usually the husband's, sperm is used
to artificially inseminate a surrogate; and the modem ART technique wherein an
in vitro fertilized egg is implanted into a surrogate who is genetically unrelated to
the donor-providers. Unfortunately, there is a wide discrepancy among states over
the enforceability and legality of gestational surrogacy agreements: the legislative
spectrum spans from enforcement of such contracts on the one hand, to criminal
prosecution of individuals involved in the "ART' of gestational surrogacy on the
other.5
This Article critically examines and analyzes the advantages and disadvantages
of surrogacy contracts, with its primary focus being on gestational surrogacy.
Because of the historical common law and the contemporary statutory hostility to
traditional surrogacy arrangements-assuming arguendo that such legislation even
exists from state-to-state-this Article argues in favor of the creation of new
uniform regulation governing gestational surrogacy contracts. At the very least,
such legislation should recognize the significant medical, legal, ethical, and moral
differences between traditional and modem gestational surrogacy.
Part II of this Article briefly discusses the courts' treatment of traditional
surrogacy contracts.6 Part HI next reviews court decisions regarding gestational
surrogacy contracts.7 Part IV analyzes in depth the many varied and haphazard
legislative approaches to the surrogacy contract problem and the state legislatures'
failure to distinguish between the radically different surrogate techniques.8 Part V
addresses the moral and ethical implications of surrogacy. 9 Finally, Part VI of this
Article concludes by offering sample legislation governing-gestational surrogacy
arrangements.' 0

Human Oocyles and Ovarian Tissue: An Emerging Technology, 69 FERTILITY & STERILITY 1, 1-6 (1998).
5.
See infra Part IV for a full discussion of the regulation of gestational surrogacy arrangements.
6.
Infra Part II.
7.
Infra Part HI.
8.
!nfra PartIV.
9.
lnfra Part V.

10. See infra Part VI (proposing the Uniform Gestational Surrogacy Contract Act).
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II. TRADITIONAL SURROGACY CONTRACTS

Traditional surrogacy" involves a contract between an infertile couple ("H" and
"W," for example) and a fertile woman (the "surrogate"). In the traditional
surrogacy contract, the surrogate agrees to be inseminated with H's sperm, and to
carry the pregnancy to term. After the birth of the baby, the surrogate promises to
relinquish all rights to the baby, transfer the baby to H and W, and facilitate W's
adoption of the baby.' 2 For this, all of the surrogate's expenses are paid by H and
W, who also pay a fee for the surrogate's services. These traditional surrogate
contracts have not been well received in the common law courts.
The first traditional surrogate contract case to reach a state supreme court
occurred in 1987 in In re Baby M. 3 In this case, the New Jersey courts were asked
to determine the validity of a contract that utilized a new way to bring a child into
a family.14 In addition to expenses, the surrogacy contract in Baby M. provided for
a fee often thousand dollars for the woman's services.' 5 For this consideration, the
woman promised to be inseminated with the contracting husband's sperm, to carry
the conceived child to birth, to transfer custody of the child to the husband-father,
to relinquish all legal rights to the child, and finally, to assist with any formalities
of adoption by the wife.16 However, after the child was born, the gestational mother
refused to honor the contract and demanded custody of the child.'7 The husband and
wife then sued for specific enforcement of the contract.' s
The trial court held that New Jersey statutes governing adoption, termination
of parental rights, and the prohibition of the payment of money in connection with
adoption did not apply to surrogacy contracts.' 9 The trial court found the surrogacy
contract valid and ordered specific performance of the contract.20 Granting the

11. The origin of surrogacy dates back as far as the biblical story of Genesis. Sarah, Abraham's infertile
wife, directs Abraham to "go into my maid," Hagar, so that Sarah "may found a family through her." Genesis 16:2
(King James). Thereby, Hagar became the first documented surrogate. What did Hagar have to say about this? We
do not know.
The second documented surrogate was Rachel's slave Bilhah. Infertile Rachel encouraged her husband Jacob
to "lie with [Bilhah], so that she may bear sons to be laid upon my knees, and through her I too may build up a
family." Genesis 30:3-5 (King James).
From these early surrogacy arrangements, exploitation of surrogates has been suspect. However, is the
dominant concern the exploitation of the surrogate as a woman or the exploitation of the surrogate as a slave? This
paper will argue that the concern is the exploitation of the woman as a slave because the slave has no choice in
assenting to the surrogacy.
12. In this example, the sperm provider is the undisputed father of the child.
13. 537 A.2d 1227 (NJ. 1988).
14. Id. at 1234.
15. Id. at 1235.

16. Id.
17.

Id. at 1236-37.

18. Id. at 1237.
19. Id. at 1238.
20. Id.

2000/Reproductive Surrogacy at the Millennium
any parental rights of the
husband sole custody of the child,2' the trial court severed
22
surrogate and granted adoption rights to the wife.
On appeal, the New Jersey Supreme Court reversed the trial court and
invalidated the surrogacy contract, holding that the surrogacy contract conflicted
with the same laws the trial court had found inapplicable.23 The State Supreme
Court held that the payment of money to a surrogate mother was illegal, contrary
to public policy, and "potentially degrading to women." 24 While the court granted
child custody rights to the father, it voided the wife's parental rights and the wife's
adoption of the child. The Supreme Court then declared the surrogate to be the
child's natural and legal mother.26 The court added, however, that "where a woman
voluntarily and without payment agrees to act as a 'surrogate mother,' provided that
she is not subject to a binding agreement to surrender her child," no New Jersey law
is offended.27 The court appeared to be stating that surrogacy per se does not offend
New Jersey law; however, the enforcement of a surrogacy contract is offensive to
New Jersey law.
A few years after the decision in Baby M., a California appellate court ruled on
the validity of "traditional surrogacy" contracts in In re MarriageofMoschetta.2
The California court began by distinguishing traditional surrogacy from an earlier
California Supreme Court case addressing gestational surrogacy.29 The appellate
court also distinguished a prior California case involving a sperm supplier who

21. The trial court found, among others, the following facts: the surrogate party had fled the state with the
baby to avoid service of process; the surrogate lived in twenty different motels and homes in the next three months
to avoid prosecution; threatened to kill herself and kill the child; and falsely accused the husband of sexually
molesting the surrogate's other child. Id. at 1237.
22. Id. at 1237-38.
23. Id. at 1234.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 1235. The states of Florida, Nevada, New Hampshire, and Virginia have adopted statutes
providing that unpaid surrogacy contracts are explicitly enforceable through specific performance, although New
Hampshire requires advance judicial approval of the agreement, and even then permits the surrogate to opt out
of the agreement within seventy two hours of the birth of the child. Virginia requires the intended mother to be
infertile for the agreement to be valid, and requires advance judicial approval of the agreement (but not of the
"opt-out" provision) for the contract to be enforceable. See infra Appendix I (setting forth the relevant Florida,
Nevada, New Hampshire, and Virginia statutes).
28. In re Marriage of Moschetta, 25 Cal. App. 4th 1218, 1221-22 (1994) (holding traditional surrogacy
contracts unenforceable and invalid in California).
29. Id.Gestational surrogacy contracts were addressed prior to In re Marriage of Moschetta by the
California Supreme Court in Jolmson v. Calvert,5 Cal. 4th 84 (1993). Gestational surrogacy involves the in vitro
fertilization of sperm with an egg which then grows into an embryo. This embryo is then implanted in another
woman's uterus. The woman gestates the child for the "intended" mother and father, and under the terms of the
gestational contract, is (usually) paid for her services. The gestational mother is not, therefore, genetically related
to the child.

McGeorge Law Review / Vol. 31
asserted his parental rights.3" The Court of Appeal relied on a California statute
requiring that consent for adoption of the baby be obtained by, and in the presence
of, a licensed social worker.3' Because traditional surrogacy contracts are
necessarily made before the child is born, the court found that traditional surrogacy
contracts cannot comply with the California provision because no baby exists at the
time the contract is formed.32 Consequently, the court held that traditional surrogacy
contracts are invalid in California.
As these cases demonstrate, the common law evidences judicial hostility toward
traditional surrogacy contracts, and holds these contracts to be invalid as against
public policy, or to be otherwise unenforceable. This consistent judicial approach
of holding traditional surrogacy contracts unenforceable cracked in 1998 under the
holdings of two traditional surrogacy cases. The Connecticut Supreme Court,
apparently persuaded more by considerations of equity than of common law, upheld
the validity of traditional surrogacy contracts in two separate cases.
The first such instance occurred in the Connecticut Supreme Court case of Jane
Doe v. John Doe.34 Here, John and Jane Doe's advertisement for a surrogate in their
local newspaper resulted in a woman's agreement to serve as their surrogate.35
John and Jane Doe, not being a couple to waste perfectly good medical
36
insurance premiums, accompanied the surrogate to her pre-natal doctor visits.
During these visits, the surrogate assumed Jane's identity and used Jane's name and
social security number.37 Upon admission to the hospital for delivery, the surrogate
identified herself as Jane, and the birth certificate indicated Jane's name as the
mother.38 The surrogate, of course, signed Jane's name on all the hospital forms,

30. See id. at 1222 (distinguishing JhordanC. v. Mary K., 179 Cal. App. 3d 386 (1986)). In Jhordan,the
court ambiguously referred to the sperm supplier as a sperm "donor." Here, as in the traditional surrogacy contract,

the baby is genetically related to the sperm supplier and the gestational mother. The issue was whether the sperm
"donor" was an intentional "true" donor. Donation implies relinquishment of any right to the item donated. True

donation occurs for example when the source of sperm sells a sample to a sperm bank. Id. at 1230-31.
31.

See In re Marriage of Moschetta, 25 Cal. App. 4th at 1231 (citing California Family Code section

8814).
32. Id
33. Id. at 1222-23. The traditional surrogate-contract child is the product of the intended father and the
unintended mother, and genetically related to both.
34. 710 A.2d 1297 (Conn. 1998). Jane, having borne three previous children in another country and then
undergoing a tubal ligation, met John. Together, they decided to have a child. A tubal reconstruction reanastomosis procedure was unsuccessful, and Jane's pregnancy via the usual means was not possible. Id. at 1302-

03.
35. Jane Doe v. John Doe, 710 A.2d 1297, 1302-03 (Conn. 1998). The price agreed upon, the woman
surrogate was inseminated by John and Jane at the surrogate's house using a syringe filled with John's semen. Id.

The surrogate, incidently, was also married and living with her husband at the time.
36. ld
37. Id.
38. Id.
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including the birth certificate. 39 True to her bargain, the surrogate delivered the
baby to John and Jane upon leaving the hospital, never to bother the couple again. 40
The apparently successful ruse collapsed when Jane filed for divorce and
requested custody of the then fourteen-year-old child.4 ' John countered with the
uncontested fact that Jane was not the biological mother and that Jane had never
legally adopted the child.42 The trial court held that the child was not an issue of the
marriage and thus the court had no subject matter jurisdiction to determine the.
custody dispute between John and Jane.43

Complicating matters, the surrogate was married and living with her husband
during the course of the pregnancy and delivery." Connecticut law provides that a
child born to a married woman living with her husband is a presumed child of the
(surrogate's) marriage.45 The trial court concluded that this presumption had not
been rebutted by the requisite clear and convincing evidence.46 At that point, it
appeared that neither John nor Jane could be declared the child's legal parent
because the presumed parents had moved out of the jurisdiction and were
unavailable.
After the trial court's ruling that the child was not an issue of John and Jane's
marriage, John brought a motion in probate court to be declared the child's father,
and to sever any parental rights of the surrogate and her former husband.4 7 This
motion was granted by the probate court.48 The trial court, deferring to the probate
court's holding declaring John to be the father, subsequently ruled that it did not
have jurisdiction to decide custody.49 Thus, by default, the trial court ensured the

father's custody of the child.50
On appeal, the Connecticut Supreme Court reversed the trial court, and
concluded that the trial court did have subject matter jurisdiction over the custody
matter.51 Further, the court held that the statutory presumption that a child's best
interest is to be with the natural parent did not apply.52 The case was remanded to
the trial court for a determination of child custody solely based on the best interests

39. Id.
40. Id. at 1303.
41. Id. at 1301.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 1303.
44. Id.
45. Schafferv. Schaffer, 445 A.2d 589,590 (Conn. 1982) (holding that children who otherwise might have
been deemed illegitimate are presumed at common law to be "children of the marriage" if they were born to the
wife during the course of the marriage).
46. JaneDoe, 710 A.2d at 1303.
47. Id.at 1302. The parental rights of the surrogate were now uncontested. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.at 1303.
50. Id. at 1302.
51. Id. at 1319.
52. Id.
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of the child. 3 While specifying that Connecticut's equitable parent doctrine did not

apply to the facts of this case,' the court suggested that the wife should receive
custody of the child.55 This, of course, is precisely the application of the equitable

parent doctrine.
This case serves as an example of the twisted reasoning that a court, bound by

a policy of invalidating surrogacy contracts, will resort to in order to give effect to
the substantial purposes of a surrogacy arrangement.5 6 The court here suggests that
the "best interests of the child" test trumps the jurisdiction's common and statutory

law. However, the "best interests of the child" test is normally used to determine
which parent will be awarded custody. Evidently, the court here would vest

complete equity power in the trial courts to determine child custody on a best
interest basis, whether or not the child issued from the marriage.
Later, during .the same year that Jane Doe v. John Doe was decided, the

Connecticut Supreme Court became the subject of another controversy regarding
one of its decisions. In Mary Doe v. John Roe,58 the Connecticut Supreme Court
ruled on whether the Superior Court, the trial court of general jurisdiction, had
subject matter jurisdiction to render judgment in accordance with a stipulated

agreement reached in probate court.5 9 The post-baby birth settlement agreement at
issue in the case included a promise by the traditional surrogate mother to consent,
for additional consideration, to the termination of her parental rights.6

53. Id. at 1324. While the court stated that Connecticut's equitable parent doctrine would not apply to these
facts, the court remanded the case suggesting that joint custody would be in the best interests of the child. Id. at
1324.
54. 1& at 1318 n.46. The court stated that the equitable parent doctrine
has considerable emotional appeal, because it permits a court, in a particularly compelling case, to
conclude that, despite the lack of biological or adoptive ties to the child, the deserving adult
nonetheless may be determined to be the child's parent. This appeal may be enhanced in a given case
because the best interests of the child [may be] ... determined irrespective of the otherwise invalid
claim of parentage.... That doctrine, however, would lack the procedural and substantive safeguards
provided to the natural parents and the child by the adoption statutes. In addition, the equitable parent
doctrine, which necessarily requires an ad hoc, case-by-case determination of parentage after the facts
of the case have been determined, would eliminate the significant degree of certainty regarding who
is and who is not a child's parent. ...
Id.
55. Id.
56. Baby M. and In re Marriageof Moschetta hold that surrogacy contracts are invalid or unenforceable,
and imply that genetic relationships control, with the non-gestational wife having no parental rights
notwithstanding the intention of the parties at the time of contract. Baby M., 537 A.2d at 264; In re Marriage of
Moschetta, 25 Cal. App. 4th at 1222. Jane Doe suggests that intention coupled with time can prevail over
established common law. See JaneDoe, 710 A.2d at 1337 (citing both time and intent of the parties as factors to
consider).
57. Normally, the best interests test is used to determine which legal parent will receive custody of a child.
The court here implied that the legal parent requirement was a nullity.
58. 717 A.2d 706 (Conn. 1998).
59. Id. at 707-08.
60. Id.
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In this case, a traditional surrogacy contract between a husband and a surrogate
resulted in the birth of a healthy baby boy.6' Four months later, the surrogate mother
filed a motion for habeas corpus in probate court, seeking custody of the child. 62
She also filed for declaratory judgment, requesting a determination that the
surrogacy contract was void as against public policy and voidable as a coercive
contract allegedly signed under duress and false pretenses. 63 The husband
counterclaimed, asking the court for "specific performance of the surrogacy
contract." 64 During the course of the litigation, a settlement was reached in which
the surrogate mother agreed to relinquish her parental rights for additional
consideration.6 5 The probate court accepted the settlement agreement, terminated
the surrogate's parental rights, and authorized proceedings to begin for stepparent
adoption. 66
Because the surrogate refused to sign the adoption papers or relinquish custody
of the child eight months after the settlement agreement had been accepted by the
probate court, the husband and wife filed a motion in superior court asking that
court to hold the surrogate in contempt for failing to comply with the terms of the
settlement agreement. 67 The surrogate countered with a motion to dismiss the case
on the grounds that the superior court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. 63
The Connecticut Supreme Court, arguably acting in the child's best interest,
ultimately ignored the invalid traditional surrogacy contract, and ruled that the
superior court had jurisdiction to enforce the settlement agreement, and that the69
superior court also had the authority to order the contract's specific enforcement.
This case suggests that if a surrogate sues to invalidate a traditional surrogacy
contract, a prudent husband and wife in Connecticut should delay settlement of the
case until the baby's birth. After the birth of the baby, a surrogate's judicially
accepted settlement agreement providing for the "voluntary" termination of her
parental rights (in consideration for more money, of course) would be enforceable
as a resolution of a custody dispute, and the husband and wife would become the
legal parents.
Thus, even though a traditional surrogacy contract would be unenforceable, the
effect of enforcement may be attained through a settlement agreement which will
likely include the original pecuniary consideration, plus some additional
consideration. This apparently does not violate adoption laws that prohibit "buying
a baby." Connecticut courts will view this type of settlement as a valid settlement

680

61.

Id. at 708.

62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 709.
Id.

68.
69.

id.
Id. at 711.
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of a disputed claim. The distinguishing feature of this case was to give effect to a

post-birth settlement agreement of apresumably unenforceable pre-birth traditional
surrogacy agreement.

These sagacious decisions float alone in a sea ofjudicial hostility to traditional
surrogacy contracts.
III. GESTATIONAL SURROGACY CONTRACTS

Gestational surrogacy differs significantly from traditional surrogacy. 0 In
gestational surrogacy, an ovum is fertilized with sperm in vitro.7' The zygote is
grown into an eight cell (or more) organism-the embryo-at which point it is
either placed into the uterus of a woman unrelated to the gamete providers, or
frozen for such use in the future. The gestational surrogacy contract is entered into
by a couple desiring to bring a child into the world and a uterus provider who is
genetically unrelated to the embryo. The gestational surrogate provides the
incubator facilitating the development and gestation of another couple's genetic
child.72
California's landmark case of Johnson v. Calvert" was the first to address the

enforceability of gestational surrogacy contracts. Crispina Calvert underwent a
hysterectomy a few weeks prior to her marriage to husband Mark.74 However, Mark

and Crispina both desired to beget their own child.75 Although Crispina was without
a uterus, her functioning ovaries continued to produce healthy eggs. 76 A
sympathizing co-worker of Crispina's mentioned Crispina's situation to a friend
who suggested that she, the co-worker's friend, could serve as the couple's

surrogate." The gestational surrogacy contract provided that for a fee,78 the

70. Because gestational surrogacy is clearly distinguished in both law and biology from traditional
surrogacy, authors and legislatures would do well to avoid the generic term "surrogacy." With the advances in
in vitro fertilization and the temporal proximity of human cloning, gestational surrogacy will become increasingly
common. Gestational surrogacy and its associated contractual arrangements will cease to be at issue only by the
advent of an effective artificial uterus, which can circumvent the need for a human uterus. When that day arrives,
needless to say, there will be a plethora of comments on the appropriateness of utilizing such a device.
71. The fertilization occurs in a petri dish outside the body.
72. Corollaries exist in the animal world. In one such example, a genetically unrelated penguin is driven
by instinct to incubate an exposed egg.
73. 851 P.2d 776 (1993).
74. Id. at 778.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Some authors declare that surrogacy contracts are an exploitation of the poor. See infra Part V. In the
instant case, the fee of $10,000 is calculated to be $1.45 per hour for 24 hours per day for 40 weeks. The
implication is that this "low" payment constitutes exploitation of the surrogate.
This argument is spurious. Since when is a voluntary, non-coercive, mutually negotiated contract to be
adjudged by an outside party to be exploitative? Neither party is required to contract. Is pregnancy a full time
occupation? Absent complications, most pregnant women work at their usual jobs during their pregnancy. Is it
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surrogate, Ms. Johnson, would have Mark and Crispina's in vitro produced embryo
implanted into her uterus, would carry the fetus to term, and would relinquish all

parental rights after the birth of the child.79
Just before delivery, a dispute arose over the financial terms of the contract.80
Ms. Johnson threatened to refuse to give up the baby after the baby was born.8 1 The
Calverts sued to be declared the child's legal and natural parents.8 2 Ms. Johnson
filed her own suit to have the contract declared an unenforceable surrogacy

contract. 83 The trial court ruled in favor of the Calverts, and ordered any parental
rights of Ms. Johnson terminated.' The Court of Appeal unanimously affirmed the
trial court.85

The California Supreme Court, in a matter of first impression, affirmed the
87
holdings of the two lower courts.86 Holding California's Uniform Parentage Act
inapplicable because under the Act a woman could claim legal motherhood either
by giving birth to the child or by proving genetic relation to the child,88 the court

declared that its decision was governed by the affirmative intent of the parents
without which "the child would not exist. ' 9 In a statement of brilliantly simple
logic, the court concluded that "[t]he parties' aim was to bring Mark and Crispina's

child into the world, not for Mark and Crispina to donate a zygote to [the
surrogate]."90 More generally, in a gestational surrogacy contract, the intent of the

not a person's autonomous right to use his or her body as he or she desires (assuming such use does not harm
others)? Is a college athletic scholarship an exploitation of a person who does not happen to be wealthy? Where
is the evidence that only poor women agree to become surrogates? It appears that this contention of exploitation
of poor women is at best a non-meritorious speculation.
79. Johnson, 851 P.2d at 778.
80. Id. at 779.
81. Id.

82. Id.
83. Id. The cases were later consolidated. Ia
84. Id.
85. Ild.
86. Id. at 778.
87. CAL FAM. CODE §§ 7600-7650 (West Supp. 1999). The CaliforniaUniform Parentage Act was enacted
as a result of the United States Senate proposing a bill entitled the "Uniform Parentage Act" as part of legislation
introduced in 1975. Johnson, 851 P.2d at 779. The proposed legislation in the U.S. Senate came about as a result
of United States Supreme Court decisions that had eliminated the legal distinction between legitimate and
illegitimate children. These cases are Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968), and Glona v. American Guarantee
Co., 391 U.S. 73 (1968). The main portions of this Senate Bill became part of the California Family Code, which
was entitled the "Uniform Parentage Act."
88. Johnson, 851 P.2dat781.
89. I at 781. This reasoning seems weak because the intent of the husband and wife in a traditional
surrogacy contract also is to bring a child into being. Because intent exists in both situations, it seems better to
rely on the genetic origins of the child as the controlling factor. Genetic origin is objective, discoverable, and
constant. Reliance on genetic origin is consistent with the result in traditional surrogacy contracts and also with
the outcome here.
The dissenting opinion in Johnson v. Calvert stated that the best interests of the child should control rather
than considerations of intent. Id. at 799-800 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
90. Id. at 782.
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two genetic (gamete) suppliers is to bring a child into the world, not to donate their
zygote to the surrogate.9' This solitary finding clearly distinguishes traditional
surrogacy from gestational surrogacy.
The court recognized that "a woman who voluntarily agrees to gestate and
deliver for a married couple a child who is their genetic offspring is situated
differently from the wife who provides the ovum for fertilization, intending to
mother the resulting child. ' 92 Additionally, the court stated that all of the parties
realized that a pregnant woman has a constitutionally protected right to abort any
fetus which she is carrying, consistent with current law.93 Any promise abrogating
that right would be unenforceable.' Additionally, the court opined that gestational
surrogacy contracts do not exploit women of lower economic status any more than
other forms of employment that are poorly paying and undesirable.95 Therefore,
surrogacy contracts are not unconscionable or coercive as a matter of
gestational
6
law.

9

The dissenting justice in Johnsonconcluded that the satisfaction of the strong
desire to have one's own genetically related child was not worth the social price of
the surrogacy arrangement. 97 He would have remanded the case to the trial court,

where the surrogacy contract dispute could be settled by using "the best interests
of the child" test.98 He cautioned that the magnitude and severity of public policy
considerations demand immediate legislative attention and action.9
Those criticizing gestational surrogacy as economically exploitative should note
that the Johnsoncourt assumed that women of lower economic classes would more
likely serve as contractual surrogates than those of higher economic classes.
However, the California Supreme Court found no factual basis to support the
exploitation contention.'w The court added that no proof existed to show that
surrogacy contracts exploit poor women more than general economic necessity in
general exploits them by inducing them to accept lower paying or otherwise
undesirable employment.' 0'
In the 1994 Belsito v. Clark"2 decision, an Ohio court found that its State
statutes did not resolve surrogacy issues.' 03 The Court found the State's birth

91. Id.

92. Id. at 785.
93. Id. at 784-85.
94. Id. at 785.
95. I1.
96. I1&at 784.
97. Id. at 800-01 (Keniard, L,dissenting).
dissenting).
98. Id. (Kennard, J.,
dissenting).
99. Id. (Kennard, J.,
100. Id.at785.
101. Id.
102. 644 N.E.2d 760 (Ohio 1994).
103. Id. at 763.
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registration statutes inapplicable in a gestational surrogacy arrangement. 104 In
Belsito, the wife had undergone a hysterectomy just before marriage. 05 Knowing
of the couple's yearning to have a child, the wife's sister agreed to gestate the
couple's in vitro conceived embryo without compensation.'06 As the pregnancy
neared term, the couple learned of an Ohio law providing that if the birth mother
is not married to the father, the child is officially deemed illegitimate.'07 To avoid
stigmatizing their child as illegitimate, the genetic mother (wife) and genetic father
(husband) filed a motion requesting a declaratory judgment finding them to be the
legal and natural parents of the soon-to-arrive baby.'03
The court found Ohio's birth registration statutes inapplicable in a gestational
surrogacy setting.'0 9 Consistent with Johnson, the Belsito court noted that the
gestational mother was genetically unrelated to the embryo, and that the genetic
providers' (husband and wife's) intent governed whether the child would be
brought into being." 0 Because the husband and wife provided the child's genes, and
because the husband and wife intended to bring the child into being, the court held
the husband and wife to be the child's natural and legal 2parents.'' The birth
certificate was subsequently ordered to indicate this status."
Thus, the Supreme Court of California and the court of Ohio reached the same
compelling holding regarding gestational surrogacy contracts: the providers of the
genetic gametes are the natural and legal parents of the child, and the intent of those
13
providers to bring the child into the world controls.
Perhaps the ultimate gestational surrogacy contract case, involving five parties,
occurred in California's Buzzanca v. Buzzanca." 4 In Buzzanca, a sterile husband
and an infertile wife, desiring a child but wanting to have some choice over the
child's genetic constituency, obtained a donated egg and selected donated sperm for

104. Id. at 768.
105. Id. at 761. This is the same fact the court faced in Johnson. Johnson, 851 P.2d at 778.
106. Belsito, 644 N.E.2d at 761.

107. Id. at 762.
108. Id.

109. ld. at 768.
110. Id. at 764. The court here, as did the court in Johnson, specified that the genetic provider's intent is

of such critical significance that without it, the baby would not have been born. This intent is distinguished from
the intent of the husband and wife in a traditional surrogacy arrangement, where the wife's position sinks to the
level of an intended third party beneficiary of the contract between the sperm-provider husband and the ovumproviding surrogate. In a gestational surrogacy contract, the gamete-providing husband and wife's intent governs
whether the embryo will be created.

111. Id. at 767.
112. Id.
at 768.
113. See generally Teresa Abell, Note, Gestational Surrogacy: Intent-Based Parenthood in Johnson v.
Calvert, 45 MERcER L. REv. 1429, 1430 (1994) (explaining that the child's existence is due to the intentions upon
which the Calvert's acted). The court used a modified "but-for" analysis. "But-for" the Calverts' acts in bringing
about the pregnancy, "the child would not have existed."
114. 61 Cal. App. 4th 1410 (1998).
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in vitro fertilization.115 The resulting embryo was implanted into the uterus of
another woman serving as a contractual gestational surrogate.11 6 Thus, neither the
husband nor the wife was genetically related to the embryo, which was derived
from an egg donor and sperm donor. The gamete donors were related neither to the
contracting couple nor to the gestational surrogate.
11 7
Just before the birth of the child, Mr. Buzzanca filed for divorce.
Ms. Buzzanca, claiming that she and her husband were the child's parents,
demanded paternal child support payments. 8 Mr. Buzzanca disclaimed any
paternal responsibility on the grounds that he was not genetically related to the
child and that the gestational surrogacy contract was invalid because it was signed
after the pregnancy had commenced. 9 The surrogate made clear that her
responsibilities were limited to those of a contractual gestational surrogate. 20 The
gamete providers' were donors that had relinquished their rights at the time of
their gamete donations.
The trial court determined that parenthood could be established by showing the
claimant had given birth to the child or by proving genetic relation through the use
of blood tests.'2 Because the Buzzancas were not genetically related to the child,
the gametes were donated without intent to reserve parental fights, and the
gestational mother was only obligated to perform under the terms of the contract,
the trial court found that the baby was born legally parentless!'12
On appeal, the Fourth District Court of Appeal noted that under California
common law, fatherhood could be established if the husband "consented" to the
artificial insemination of his wife. 24 The court held this rule to be applicable to the
case before it.'2 Because Mr. Buzzanca had consented to the in vitro fertilization26
which was intended to result in a child, he was found to be the lawful father.
Uncontested, Ms. Buzzanca was likewise held to be the child's mother. The child's
procreation was the product of a medical procedure initiated by parties intending
to be parents. The court reasoned that, as the legal father, Mr. Buzzanca was
entitled to all the1 2rights
and responsibilities of fatherhood, including the payment
7
of child support.

115. Id. at 1412.
116. Ud.

117. Id. at 1413.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 1414. Recall that under Baby M., the non-genetically related spouse has no claim of parenthood
absent adoption. See supra notes 13-27 and accompanying text (discussing In re Baby M.).
120. Buzzanca, 61 Cal. App. 4th at 1414.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 1412.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 1412-13.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 1413.

127. Id. at 1412.
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Buzzanca follows the reasoning and holding the of California's Supreme Court
in Johnson, and concurs with the Ohio Supreme Court in Belsito.128 This judicial
practice of enforcing gestational surrogacy contracts while refusing to enforce
traditional surrogacy contracts is not found in statutes, but is instead the sole
creation of case law.
IV. STATUTORY REGULATION OF SURROGACY

Some states have adopted the Uniform Parentage Act (UPA),12 9 which appears
to apply to surrogacy contracts. Under the UPA, parentage can be established by
proving either a genetic relationship to the child, or by the woman's delivery of the
child. Applying the Act to a traditional surrogacy situation, the surrogate and the
semen provider (usually the contracting husband) are the child's mother and father.
Because the wife is neither genetically related to the child nor is she the birth
mother, she has no legal parentage status. By contrast, in typical gestational
surrogacy, both the husband and the wife are genetically related to the child,
thereby providing the wife with a claim under the UPA.
Presently, four states have statutorily recognized the validity and enforceability
of surrogacy contracts: Florida, Nevada, New Hampshire, and Virginia.13 All of
these states prohibit the compensation of a surrogate,13 ' although they permit
payments for direct and indirect medical expenses. Florida, New Hampshire, and
Virginia are the only states that specifically recognize gestational surrogacy as
distinct from traditional surrogacy (although New Hampshire explicitly enforces
non-compensated traditional surrogacy contracts as well)., Except for these three
states, no other state statutorily distinguishes gestational surrogacy from traditional
surrogacy. Furthermore, New Hampshire and Virginia require advance judicial
133
approval of the agreement in order for the surrogacy contract to be enforceable.
Arkansas law appears to address only surrogates impregnated by artificial
insemination. 34 The law presumes that the child born by means of artificial
1 35
insemination belongs to the intended mother rather than the surrogate mother.

128. Supra notes 111-13 and accompanying text.
129. UNIF. PARENTAGE Acr § 5, 9B U.L.A. 301 (1987).
130. See Appendix I.

131. Outrageously, Nevada permits prostitution in licensed brothels (needless to say, for large profits), but
will not enforce a surrogacy contract if the surrogate is compensated. See Nay. REV. STAT. ANN. § 201.354

(Michie 1999) (providing for legalized prostitution and solicitation occurring in a licensed house of prostitution);
let § 126.045(3) (Michie 1997) (stating that surrogacy contracts in which the surrogate receives compensation for
her services are unenforceable).

132. See Appendix I.
133. See Appendix L
134. 1989 Ark. Acts § 1.
135. ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-10-201 (Michie 1998).
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Surrogacy contracts are declared void by statute in the following states:
Louisiana, Michigan, Nebraska, New York, North Dakota, and
Arizona, Indiana,
36
Tennessee.1
The following six jurisdictions provide for criminal penalties for various acts
involving surrogacy contracts: District of Columbia, Kentucky, Michigan, New
York, Utah, and Washington state. 37 Kentucky, Nebraska, and Washington define
surrogacy contracts as those in which a woman is compensated for gestating a baby
conceived by artificial means.13 1 One could infer from these statutes that noncompensated arrangements are lawful and presumably enforceable assuming
compliance with contract law.
In Kentucky, the legislature disagreed with the court as to the enforceability of
surrogacy arrangements. The Kentucky Supreme Court ruled in Surrogate
ParentingAssociates v. Commonwealth 39 that compensated surrogate parenting
contracts were enforceable. The Kentucky Legislature responded by passing a bill
providing that compensated surrogacy arrangements were unenforceable in their
state. " This implies that the Kentucky Legislature followed Florida, Nevada, New
statutes provide that uncompensated surrogacy
Hampshire, and Virginia, whose
4
arrangements are enforceable.' '
It is thus apparent that gestational surrogacy contracts can be viewed either as
valid and enforceable, or as invalid and subject to a felony violation with prison
term as a possible penalty (along with associated revocation of professional
licenses). Some states, such as Florida and Virginia, specifically address gestational
surrogacy contracts. Others, like New Hampshire, only imply a recognition of
gestational surrogacy contracts. 142 However, most state legislatures that have
addressed the issue do not distinguish between traditional and gestational surrogacy.
All of these inconsistencies occurred despite the brilliant 1993 California Supreme
Court decision which could not have more clearly delineated the distinction
between traditional and gestational surrogacy contracts.

136. See Appendix II.
137. See Appendix ll.
138. See Appendix IV.
139. 704 S.W.2d 209 (Ky. 1986). Specifically, the court provided that these contracts did not violate the
law prohibiting the selling of babies. Id. at 214.

140. Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 199.590(4) (Banks-Baldwin 1997).
141. See Appendix I.
142. See Appendix I.
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V. MORAL AND ETHICAL IMPLICATIONS

Opponents of surrogacy have lobbed criticism at the mere concept of surrogacy.
Some opponents contend that surrogacy exploits women.143 The court in Baby M.
stated that compensated surrogacy agreements financially exploit vulnerable
women in a fashion similar to baby selling.' 4 The court declared that a pre-existing
contractual commitment, the threat of a lawsuit, and the inducement of a $10,000
payment renders the contract inherently involuntary.145 Further, the court implied
that the rather large payment used as consideration in a surrogacy contract gives
rise to an unacceptable class distinction
whereby rich, barren women benefit at the
146
expense of poor, fertile women.
One commentator maintains that little compelling evidence exists to support the
claim that surrogate arrangements are inherently exploitative. 47 He contends that
there are many other motives for women to become surrogates: many wish to help
an infertile couple beget a child; others wish to experience pregnancy and childbirth
without having to raise a child. 14 Thus, he concludes, the financial exploitation
argument appears weak at best.
Another exploitation argument contends that surrogacy reduces a woman to the
status of a commercial good. This is the so-called "commodification" argument. 49
Adherents to this argument fear that women will be hired as surrogates because of
their beauty, intelligence, or race.t'° Professor Richard Epstein rejects this argument
as an effort by some to impose their own conception of the right and proper thing
to do with bodies, sperm, and eggs upon those who may feel differently.'' Epstein
believes that no one's views on commodification should be imposed on those who
52
disagree.
Some argue that surrogacy contracts prostitute or enslave women in exchange
for money. 53 They argue that, like prostitutes, surrogates are forced into the role of

143. But see generally John L. Hill, Exploitation,79 CoRNELLL. REV. 631 (1994) (arguing that there is no
substance to the exploitation theory).
144. In re Baby M., 537 A.2d 1227, 1250 (NJ. 1988).

145. d. at 1248.
146. Id. at 1249.

147. Hill, supra note 143, at 691-95.
148. Il

149. See generally MARGARET J. RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODmES (1996) (providing a thorough
presentation of the theory that surrogacy relegates the surrogate and the surrogate's product, the child, to the status

of a commercial good).
150. Hill, supra note 143, at 639-44.
151. Richard A. Epstein, Surogacy: The CaseforFullContractualEnforcement,81 VA. L. RE.V.2305,2326

(1995). See generally iU. at 2324-30 (addressing non-traditional objections to surrogacy contracts, such as
commodification, subordination, and incommensurability).
152. Id. at 2326.

153. See generally Katherine B. Lieber, Note, Selling the Womb: Can the FeministCritique of Surrogacy
Be Answered?, 68 IND. LJ. 205 (1992) (arguing against surrogacy contracts).

McGeorgeLaw Review / Vol. 31

surrogate out of sheer economic necessity.' These commentators conclude that
because prostitution is morally wrong and generally illegal, surrogacy should be
viewed in the same manner.155 Epstein counters that courts cannot refuse to enforce
surrogacy contracts simply because some disapprove of the motives and actions of
Parenthoodv. Casey 57 stated,
others. 5 6 Further, as the Supreme Court in Planned
58
morality alone cannot be the basis for the law.'
Professor Hill explains that for a contract to be exploitative, an offer must
create or take advantage of a known psychological vulnerability rendering the
victim incapable of making reasonable decisions. 59 Consequently, commercial
contracts such as surrogacy contracts are not generally exploitative.' 6°
Finally, traditional surrogacy arrangements are criticized as being akin to babyselling. Because state statutes generally prohibit, in the context of adoption,
exchanging money for a baby, surrogacy contracts should be prohibited because the
result is the same: i.e., the procurement of a baby for money.' 6 ' Commercial
surrogacy places a baby in a home without considering whether the prospective
parents would be suitable.' 62 However, this argument is undermined when one
considers that innumerable babies are born everyday into households where the
parents may be considered unsuitable.
Perhaps the more common feminist approach to surrogacy is exemplified by the
famous anthropologist Margaret Sanger, who proclaimed that "[n]o woman can call
herself free who does not own and control her own body."' 63 Sanger and others
sharing her view implicitly maintain that any restriction of a woman's right to do
with her body as she wishes, under any moral or ethical theory, violates the
woman's right to ownership of and control over her own body. Supreme Court
decisions in Roe v. Wade"6 and PlannedParenthoodv. Casey'6 appear to at least
recognize Sanger's point of view.
With the advance of artificial reproductive technological capabilities and the
proximity of clinical experimentation in human cloning, there is a compelling need
to develop a uniform approach to surrogacy among the states. If uniformity is not
achieved, a doctor in state "A" assisting with the surrogacy process would be guilty
of a felony, while in adjacent state "B," the same doctor, assisting a couple
154. See generally id.

155. See generally iL
156. Epstein, supra note 151, at 2341.
157. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
158. Id. at 850 (stating that men and women of good conscience can disagree about the basic principles of
morality, but they cannot mandate the citizens' moral code).
159. Hill, supranote 143, at 661-83.
160. 1l
161. In re Baby M., 537 A.2d at 1241-43.

162. Id.
163. MARGARET SANGER, WOMAN AND THE NEW RACE 8 (1920).
164. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
165. 505 U.S. 833 (1993).
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contracting to beget their baby, would be doing so under a statutorily regulated,
positive public policy. Traditional surrogacy contracting has been pummeled by
both the courts and the legislatures. The future lies in gestational surrogacy, which
has been received favorably in both courts and legislatures, even if confusedly by
the latter. It is time for our legislators to awaken to the reality of the promises

afforded by gestational surrogacy.
VI. A PROPOSED UNIFORM GESTATIONAL SURROGACY CONTRACT ACT

It is presently possible for a physician practicing medicine in state "A" to be
found guilty of committing a felony for assisting a couple contracting to beget a
baby through gestational surrogacy; in adjacent state "B," however, that same
doctor could lawfully participate in such activities and even be paid for his or her
services. This is only one of the myriad of examples wherein states' inconsistent or
non-existent legislation undermines ART and individuals' abilities to beget a child.
As noted, traditional surrogacy contracting has been battered in both the courts
and legislatures. Fortunately, the advent of in vitro fertilization has rendered
traditional surrogacy obsolete and unnecessary. These authors believe that the
future of surrogacy now firmly lies in gestational surrogacy arrangements. These
arrangements, on the whole, have been received favorably by courts, and reasonably
favored, albeit amid confusion, by legislatures. Indeed, with the advancement of the
science of ART has come the corresponding hope that ART offers for individuals
and couples who were previously unable to beget a genetically related child. These
authors believe that the potential benefits of gestational surrogacy to the general
public can only be realized upon the passage of uniform state legislation. Set forth
below is a proposed model legislation regulating gestational surrogacy.
PROPOSED UNIFORM GESTATIONAL SURROGACY CONTRACT ACT
Section I.
"Gestational surrogacy," as used herein, means an embryo not
genetically related to the woman in whom implantation of the embryo will
occur, and which is implanted into the uterus of that woman for the purpose
of developing the embryo into a fetus and resulting in the birth of a live
baby.
Section 11.
Gestational surrogacy contracts shall be governed by the contract law
of the jurisdiction in which the contract was signed. A gestational surrogate
shall be entitled to reasonable compensation for her services, either as
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provided in the contract agreement or, if not so provided, as otherwise
ordered by the court.
Section II.
(A) A gestational surrogacy contract shall be presumed valid and
enforceable as a matter of law when, prior to the commencement of the in
vitro fertilization, a court of general jurisdiction:
(1) conducts a hearing at which all parties to the contract must appear;
(2) interviews said parties to the contract and determines that all parties
have the requisite capacity to enter into the contract and that there is an
absence of coercion, duress, and exploitation; and
(3) makes findings that the parties understand the contract terms, including
the constitutional right of the gestating female to abort the fetus, as
provided by law.
(B) Upon a finding by the court of general jurisdiction that the parties have
complied with the provisions of this Act, the court shall specifically
enforce the contract against the surrogate should the latter subsequently
refuse to perform her obligation under the agreement. The court may, in its
discretion, require any party challenging the enforceability of a surrogacy
agreement complying with the requirements of this Act, to pay attorneys'
fees and costs to the other party or parties to the valid agreement.
(C) Once approved by the court, the gestational surrogacy contract shall not
be modifiable except by the written consent of every party to the contract
and only then, upon approval by the court.
Section IV.

The court may appoint an attorney to represent any party to the
gestational surrogacy contract if the court, in its discretion, finds that one
or more of the parties to said contract cannot afford legal services on their
own and the court further determines that any of said parties do not
understand the nature or legal effect of the contract and the parties' rights
and obligations arising therefrom.
Section V.
The court may order, sua sponte, medical examinations, psychiatric
consultations, or other expert evaluations if the court deems these
appropriate to a sagacious decision regarding the contract.
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Contracts developed under this Uniform Act would sustain the benefit of preapproved gestational surrogacy contracts.'6 The Uniform Act follows the holding
of the Johnson court, and protects gamete providers from the vicissitudes of a
surrogate. Section I specifies that only contracts involving the implantation of nongenetically related gametic sources have the potential of acquiring enforceability.
This requirement distinguishes gestational surrogacy from traditional surrogacy,
wherein, as the result of artificial insemination, the surrogate is genetically related
to the fetus. It also distinguishes situations wherein a genetically related gamete is
fertilized in vitro and implanted into the surrogate. This requirement of no genetic
relationship to the implanted embryo is necessary for the Act to be consistent with
Johnson.167

Admittedly, this requirement restricts a woman from donating her own egg,
thereby relinquishing all ownership rights over her ovum, and serving as the
surrogate for the zygote product of her in vitro fertilized egg. However, permitting
this exception would blur the distinction between the genetically related traditional
surrogate and the non-genetically related gestational surrogate. This distinction has
characterized court decisions in this area and allowed courts to distinguish invalid
agreements from enforceable contracts. o
The provision contained in Section II applies thejurisdiction's contract law, and
ensures a party's protections against adhesion, fraud, etcetera, which have
developed over time and are accepted public policy. Providing for a gestational
surrogate's reasonable compensation conflicts with the statutes of all four states that
provide for the enforceability of gestational surrogacy contracts.1 69 However, it
seems unreasonable to expect the substantial services of a surrogate to go without
compensation. Such compensation should enhance the pool of potential, quality
surrogates. Admittedly, compensation gives rise to the specter of commodification
and economic exploitation discussed earlier. However, the authors of this Article
concur with Epstein's arguments that the critics of compensation are but thinly
veiled moralists demanding that others' behavior conform to the critics' dictates of
right and wrong. 170 Epstein points out that moral reasoning alone has been held by
the United States 171
Supreme Court to be inappropriate and insufficient in itself to
sustain legislation.
Section mi's hearing requirement may adversely impact increasingly scarce
judicial resources. However, the importance of the subject matter of the contract
166. This Act copies the New Hampshire and Virginia requirements of prior judicial approval of gestational
surrogacy contracts.
167. Johnson, 851 P.2d at 782 (reasoning that the gametic providers intend to bring their baby into the
world, not to provide a gift of a zygote to the surrogate).
168. See supra notes 73-113 and accompanying text (discussing California's Johnson case and Ohio's
Belcito case).
169. See Appendix I (setting forth the relevant statutes of Florida, Nevada, New Hampshire, and Virginia).
170. See supra notes 151-52 and accompanying text (recapitulating Epstein's argument).
171. See generally Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 850 (1992).
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and the advantage of an experienced neutral fact-finder's first-hand viewing of the
parties' demeanor may contribute to avoiding prolonged and painful future
litigation. Such a hearing need not be lengthy. For example, if the judge deems the
parties and the contract reasonable, he or she may promptly approve them.
Nonetheless, Section Im gives ajudge the opportunity to ensure that the parties
understand and consent to the responsibilities imposed by the contract. The judge
is also allowed to evaluate the contract for overreaching or other unlawful elements
before the commencement of the in vitro procedure. Also, under Section III, the
court shall specifically enforce a contract that was previously found to comply with
this Act.
Section IV's provision that allows an attorney to be appointed for the surrogate
will enhance both fairness and the concept of equal representation to avoid
economic exploitation. Section V provides for a court's sua sponte discretion to
obtain expert professional consultation to help the judge more thoroughly evaluate
a party when the judge suspects a party's inappropriate motivation or unsuitability
as a surrogate.

VII. CONCLUSION
Adoption of model legislation governing the science of "gestational surrogacy"
is long overdue. The proposed Act in this Article distinguishes the discredited and
problematic traditional surrogacy arrangement from the valid, viable, and
enforceable gestational surrogacy covenant. The rights of the infertile to beget their
genetically related child compels legislative action to ensure both the availability
of gestational surrogacy and the enforceability of critical gestational surrogacy
contracts.
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APPENDIX I

FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 742.13, 742.15-742.16 (West 1985 & Supp. 1999).

742.15. Gestational surrogacy contract
(1) Prior to engaging in gestational surrogacy, a binding and
enforceable gestational surrogacy contract shall be made between the
commissioning couple and the gestational surrogate. A contract for
gestational surrogacy shall not be binding and enforceable unless the
gestational surrogate is 18 years of age or older and the commissioning
couple are legally married and are both 18 years of age or older.
Additionally, the commissioning mother must not be able to
gestate a pregnancy to term. The commissioning couple may agree to
pay only reasonable living, legal, medical, psychological.., expenses
directly related to prenatal, intrapartal, and postpartal periods.
NEv. REv. STAT. ANN. § 126.045 (Michie Supp. 1999).
126.045. Surrogacy Agreements: Contract requirements; treatment of
intended parents as natural parents; unlawful acts.
1. Two persons whose marriage is valid under chapter 122 of
NRS may enter into a contract with a surrogate for assisted conception.
Any such contract must contain provisions which specify the respective
rights of each party, including:
(a) Parentage of the child;
(b) Custody of the child in the event of a change of
circumstances; and
(c) The respective responsibilities and liabilities of the
contracting parties.
2. A person identified as an intended parent in a contract
described in subsection 1 must be treated in law as a natural parent
under all circumstances.
3. It is unlawful to pay or offer to pay money or anything of value
to the surrogate except for the medical and necessary living expenses
related to the birth of the child as specified in the contract.
4. As used in this section, unless the context otherwise requires:
(a) 'Assisted conception' means a pregnancy resulting when
an egg and sperm from the intended parents are placed in a
surrogatethrough the interventionof medical technology.
(b) 'Intended parents' means a man and woman, married to
each other, who enter into an agreement providing that they will be
the parents of a child born to a surrogate through assisted
conception.
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(c) "Surrogate" means an adult woman who enters into an
agreement to bear a child conceived through assisted conception
for the intended parents.
(emphasis added).
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 168-B:1 to 168-B:22 (1994 & Supp. 1999) stating, in
pertinent part:
168-B:1 Definitions

XII. "Surrogacy" or "surrogacy arrangement" means any arrangement by
which a woman agrees to be impregnated using either the intended father's
sperm, the intended mother's egg, or their preembryo with the intent that
the intended parents are to become the parents of the resulting child after
the child's birth.
168-B:16 Regulatory Procedures
I. A surrogate arrangement is lawful only if it conforms to the
requirements of this subdivision, and if, before the procedure to
impregnate the surrogate:

(b) The surrogate arrangement has been judicially preauthorized
pursuant to RSA 168-B:23; and
(c) [informed consent is obtained].

IV. No person or entity shall promote or in any other way solicit or
induce for a fee, commission or other valuable consideration, or with
the intent or expectation of receiving the same, any party or parties to
enter into a surrogacy arrangement.
168-B:22 Judicial Preauthorization.
[This statute requires a hearing within 90 days of the filing of a petition for
preauthorization].
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VA. CODE ANN. §§ 20-156 to 20-165 (Michie 1995 & Supp. 1999).
20-156. Definitions.
"Gestational mother" means the woman who gives birth to a child,
regardless of her genetic relationship to the child.
"Surrogacy contract" means an agreement between intended parents,
a surrogate, and her husband, if any, in which the surrogate agrees to
be impregnated through the use of assisted conception, to carry any
resulting fetus, and to relinquish to the intended parent the custody of
and parental rights to any resulting child.
20-159. Surrogacy contracts permissible.
A. [this section requires a written agreement whereby the surrogate
relinquishes all her rights to the child].
B. Surrogacy contracts [require prior approval by the court].
20-161. Termination of court-approved surrogacy contract.

B. Within 180 days after the last performance of any assisted
conception, a surrogate who is also a genetic parent may [request and
require the court to revoke the agreement].
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APPENDIX II
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-218(A) (West 1991) ("No person may enter into,
induce, arrange, procure or otherwise assist in the formation of a surrogate
parentage contract.").
IND. CODE ANN. §§ 31-20-1-1 to 31-20-1-2 (Michie 1997).
31-20-1-1. Legislative declarations.
Sec. 1. The general assembly declares that it is against public
policy to enforce any term of a surrogate agreement that requires
a surrogate to do any of the following:
(1) Provide a gamete to conceive a child.
(2) Become pregnant.
(3) Consent to undergo or undergo an abortion.
(4) Undergo medical or psychological treatment or
examination.
(5) Use a substance or engage in activity only in accordance
with the demands of another person.
(6) Waive parental rights or duties to a child.
(7) Terminate care, custody, or control of a child.
(8) Consent to a stepparent adoption under IC 31-19 (or IC
31-3-1 before its repeal).
31-20-1-2 Surrogate agreements void
See. 2. A surrogate agreement described in section 1 of this chapter that
is formed after March 14, 1988, is void.
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2713 (West 1991).
9:2713. Contract for surrogate motherhood; nullity
A. A contract for surrogate motherhood as defined herein shall be
absolutely null and shall be void and unenforceable as contrary to
public policy.
B. "Contract for surrogate motherhood" means any agreement
whereby a person not married to the contributor of the sperm agrees for
valuable consideration to be inseminated, to carry any resulting fetus
to birth, and then to relinquish to the contributor of the sperm the
custody and all rights and obligations to the child.
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MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. §722.855 (West 1993).

722.855. Contracts; void and unenforceable
Sec. 5. A surrogate parentage contract is void and unenforceable as contrary to
public policy.
NEB. REV. STAT. §25-21,200 (1995).
25-21,200. Contracts; void and unenforceable; definition.
(1) A surrogate parenthood contract entered into shall be void and
unenforceable. The biological father of a child born pursuant to
such a contract shall have all the rights and obligations imposed by
law with respect to such child.
(2) For purposes of this section, unless the context otherwise requires,
a surrogate parenthood contract shall mean a contract by which a
woman is to be compensated for bearing a child of a man who is
not her husband.
N.Y. DOM. REL. LAw § 122 (MeKinney Supp. 1999) ("Surrogate parenting
contracts are hereby declared contrary to the public policy of this state, and are void
and unenforceable.").
N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-18-05 (1997).
14-18-05. Surrogate agreements.
Any agreement in which a woman agrees to become a surrogate or to
relinquish that woman's rights and duties as parent of a child
conceived through assisted conception is void. The surrogate, however,
is the mother of a resulting child and the surrogate's husband, if a party
to the agreement, is the father of the child.
TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-1-102(46)(C) (1996) ("Surrogate birth-Nothing herein
shall be construed to expressly authorize the surrogate birth process in Tennessee
unless otherwise approved by the courts or the general assembly.").
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D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-402 (1997).
16-402. Prohibitions and penalties.
(a) Surrogate parenting contracts are prohibited and rendered
unenforceable in the District.
(b) Any person or entity who or which is involved in, or induces,
arranges, or otherwise assists in the formation of a surrogate
parenting contract for a fee, compensation, or other remuneration,
or otherwise violates this section, shall be subject to a civil penalty
not to exceed $10,000 or imprisonmentfor not more than 1 year,
or both.
(emphasis added).
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 199.990(2) (Michie 1995) ("[Any person who willfully
violates [KRS 199.590] shall be fined not less than one hundred dollars nor more
than two hundred dollars or imprisoned for not more than thirty days, or both.").
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.857 (West 1993 & Supp. 1999).
722.857. Surrogate parentage contract prohibited; surrogate parentage
contract as felony; penalty
Sec. 7. (1) A person shall not enter into, induce, arrange, procure, or
otherwise assist in the formation of a surrogate parentage contract
under which an unemancipated minor female or a female diagnosed as
being mentally retarded or as having a mental illness or developmental
disability is the surrogate mother or surrogate carder.
(2) A person other than an unemancipated minor female or a female
diagnosed as being mentally retarded or as having a mental illness or
developmental disability who enters into, induces, arranges, procures,
or otherwise assists in the formation of a contract described in
subsection (1) is guilty of a felony punishable by a fine not more than
$50,000.00 or imprisonment for not more than 5 years, or both.
N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 123 (MeKinney 1999) (imposing a civil penalty upon those
entering into a surrogacy agreement and classifying as a felon third-parties who
recruit or procure women to become surrogates).
123. Prohibitions and penalties
1. No person or other entity shall knowingly request, accept,
receive, pay or give any fee.., in connection with a surrogate
parenting contract ....

2000/ReproductiveSurrogacyat the Millennium

2. (a) [Any party to the contract] who violates this section shall be
subject to a civil penalty not to exceed five hundred dollars.
(b) Any other person or entity who or which induces, arranges or
otherwise assists in the formation of a surrogate parenting contract for
a fee... shall be subject to a civil penalty not to exceed ten thousand
dollars ....

[Any person who twice violates this section] shall be

guilty of a felony.
UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 76-7-204 (1995).

76-7-204. Prohibition of surrogate parenthood agreements-Status of
child-Basis of custody.
(1) (a) No person, agency, institution, or intermediary may be a party
to a contract for profit or gain in which a woman agrees to undergo
artificial insemination or other procedures and subsequently terminate
her parental rights to a child born as a result.
(b) No person, agency, institution, or intermediary may facilitate
a contract prohibited by Subsection (1). This section does not apply to
medical care provided after conception.
(c) Contracts or agreements entered into in violation of this section
are null and void, and unenforceable as contrary to public policy.
(d) A violation of this subsection is a class B misdemeanor.
(2) An agreement which is entered into, without consideration given,
in which a woman agrees to undergo artificial insemination or other
procedures and subsequently terminate her parental rights to a child
born as a result, is unenforceable.
(3) (a) In any case arising under Subsection (1) or (2), the surrogate
mother is the mother of the child for all legal purposes, and her
husband, if she is married, is the father of the child for all legal
purposes.
(b) In any custody issue that may arise under Subsection (1) or (2),
the court is not bound by any of the terms of the contract or agreement
but shall make its custody decision based solely on the best interest of
the child.
(4) Nothing in this section prohibits adoptions and adoption services
that are in accordance with the laws of this state.
(5) This section applies to contracts or agreements that are entered
into after April 24, 1989.
(emphasis added).
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §26.26.250 (West 1997) ("Any person, organization, or
agency who intentionally violates any provision [of this section] shall be guilty of
a gross misdemeanor.").
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KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 199.590 (Banks-Baldwin 1997).
199.590 Prohibited acts and practices in adoption of children; expenses
paid by prospective adoptive parents to be submitted to court

(4) A person, agency, institution, or intermediary shall not be a party
to a contract or agreement which would compensate a woman for
her artificial insemination and subsequent termination of parental
rights to a child born as a result of that artificial insemination. A
person, agency, institution, or intermediary shall not receive
compensation for the facilitation of contracts or agreements as
proscribed by this subsection. Contracts or agreements entered into
in violation of this subsection shall be void.
NEB. REv. STAT. § 25-21,200 (1995).
25-21,200. Contract; void and unenforceable; definition.
(1) A surrogate parenthood contract entered into shall be void and
unenforceable. The biological father of a child born pursuant to such
a contract shall have all the rights and obligations imposed by law with
respect to such child.
(2) For purposes of this section, unless the context otherwise requires,
a surrogate parenthood contract shall mean a contract by which a
woman is to be compensated for bearing a child of a man who is not
her husband.
WASH. REv. CODE ANN. §§ 26.26.230-26.26.240 (West 1997).
26.26.230. Surrogate parenting-Compensation prohibited
No person, organization, or agency shall enter into, induce, arrange,
procure, or otherwise assist in the formation of a surrogate parentage
contract, written or unwritten, for compensation.
26.26.240. Surrogate parenting-Contract for compensation void
A surrogate parentage contract entered into for compensation, whether
executed in the state of Washington or in another jurisdiction, shall be
void and unenforceable in the state of Washington as contrary to public
policy.

